The repetition of the failed aggression of June 2025 by the United States and Israel against Iran, in February 2026, which despite much greater preparation only made the dimensions of the aggressors’ defeat several times larger, exempts any observer from the need to argue about the stupidity of the designers of this aggression.
Among the great but stupid illusions of this aggression was the idea of changing the security architecture of the region against Iran and in favor of the Zionist regime. This illusion, at a higher level, could also have contributed to exerting geopolitical pressure on the international rivals of the United States.
While the designers of this illusion-filled strategy had set a deadline of between three days and six weeks to achieve the strategic objectives of the aggression, now, after almost six months since the beginning of the aggression and several rounds of failure of the American escalation tactic, no expert doubts that this aggression has failed to achieve any of its strategic objectives, but has even created new, larger, and more strategic problems. At the same time, it is clear that the aggressor cannot bring this unnecessary and self-generated crisis to a conclusion through war.
Iran, by accepting the Islamabad agreement, tried to provide an opportunity for the return of peace, but with the death of the Islamabad agreement at the hands of the United States, the horizon for a diplomatic exit from the deadlock for the aggressor is also seriously in doubt. The negotiations between Iran and Oman to determine a provisional navigation route in the Strait of Hormuz are progressing well, although they do not guarantee an exit from the deadlock, because the aggressor must announce and demonstrate that it fulfills its commitments in order to enter the implementation phase of all agreements, including the one related to the Strait of Hormuz, based on the agreement with Oman.
Beyond the aggressors’ inability to defeat Iran and the possibility or impossibility of exiting the existing deadlock, can it be said that this aggression has contributed to changing the security balance in favor of the aggressors? The Mecca agreement, as the first security event in the region after the American aggression, demonstrates that the answer to this question is undoubtedly negative.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from this agreement is that the countries of the region and the known partners of the United States have also become disillusioned, in practice, with trusting the United States to guarantee their security. This disillusionment goes beyond any political or diplomatic foundation and has real roots, both declarative and operational. What is clear is that the American bases in the region that were used in this aggression against Iran could not even defend themselves or the American units deployed in these countries.
Beyond this, it has even been demonstrated that these bases not only do not contribute to guaranteeing security, but, through their improper use against the security of other countries and against regional peace, are a source of regional instability and insecurity for the host country. Therefore, it is natural for the countries of the region to seek more effective options to distance themselves from the source of insecurity and, possibly, contribute to their own security. Such a perception by the countries of the region may constitute a step in the right direction.
On the other hand, the so-called Abraham Accord was also an area where the United States hoped to improve the regional balance in its own favor and in favor of the Zionist regime. But the unprecedented dimensions of the genocide perpetrated by the regime with the help of the United States in Gaza, and now also in the West Bank, with the aim of destroying the prospect of creating a Palestinian state; the securitization of the regional space; and the weakening of the credibility of the United States in the region, have severely weakened the possibilities of the so-called dream of the Abraham Accord legitimizing Israel in the region, if not completely destroyed them.
But what possible approach could the Mecca agreement have? The Zionist regime has attacked more than six countries in the region over the past three years. Beyond that, it has made prominent and repeated threats against Turkey and Pakistan, and has also indirectly pressured Saudi Arabia to sign the Abraham Accord.
On the other hand, public opinion, especially over the last two years, has heard and seen time and again, from Israeli sources, the idea of a “Greater Israel” expressed in various forms, which means the occupation of parts of several countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, while no official or unofficial authority has uttered the slightest word to reject this claim.
Although the member countries of the coalition have said that the Mecca Accord is not directed against others, if an implicit orientation for this coalition were to be considered, it should logically and potentially be assessed as a mechanism to contain the hegemonic and aggressive approach of the Israeli regime. And, in that case, like any other initiative against aggression and the weakening of peace and stability in the region, it can be valued positively.
Finally, to make a clearer assessment, we will have to wait for the consequences and the concrete functioning of this coalition, but what can be inferred up to this point is that, between the lines, positive signals of a weakening of the destabilizing role of the United States in security matters in the region and an effort to contain the offensive and aggressive approach of the Zionist regime are perceived.
